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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the fact that the corporate lessee had subleased the land for a shorter period
than the balance of the term and for a higher rental.
ROBERT N. COOK
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Home Rule
The supreme court in Sanzere v. Cincmnatil reached a decision which
is another hopeful sign to advocates of municipal home rule. The chartered
City of Cincinnati undertook a street improvement program, using its
own employees and materials, without first having obtained estimates of
the cost thereof as required by provisions of Sections 4678-1 and 4678-2 of
the Ohio General Code. However, in Section 4678-2 it is stated that this
"act [Sectons 4678-1 and 4678-2] shall not apply to any city or village
having a charter form of government." The supreme court upheld the
constitutionality of the provision on the basis that if the last sentence of
Section 4678-2 did attempt a legislative classification of municipal corpora-
tons, it was such a classification as was already recognized by Secuon 7 of
Article XVIII of the Ohio Consttution, which expressly provides for char-
tered municipalities. Thus, legislation based on the differentiation of
chartered and unchartered cities is within the sanction of the Ohio Consti-
tution.
The court properly distinguished the case of Elyrta v. Vandemrk2 in
which a population classification of municipalities by the legislature was
declared unconstitutional on the ground that it differed from the only
population basis recognized by the Ohio Constitution8 The court also
strongly implied that the matter dealt with in the legislation was a purely
local matter.
Income Tax
Prior to 1952, it had been determined by Ohio judicial decisions' that
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution was not vio-
lated by provisions of a municipally unposed income tax which required
individuals to pay such a tax on all their income regardless of where the
services which produced said income were performed, but which required
corporations having an office or place of business within the city to pay a
tax only on income earned within the city. This was reaffirmed in 1952 by
'157 Ohio St. 515, 106 N.E.2d 286 (1952).
'100 Ohio St. 365, 126 N.E. 314 (1919).
3 OHO CONsT. Art. XVIII, § 1.
'Springfield v. Krichbaum, 88 Ohio App. 329, 100 N.E.2d 281 (1950).
[Spring
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the court of appeals in the case of Springfield v. Kurtz The court further
declared that the power exists in a municipality to levy a muncipal income
tax upon the income of resident individuals earned outside of the municipal
boundaries. Thus, whereas it had previously been decided that the dis-
crimination between individuals and corporations did not act as a denial of
equal protection so as to invalidate the ordinance, the principal case stated
that the municipality's power to tax existed in its own right, and not merely
as an incident of its not being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Zoning
In State ex rel Weber v. Vaner,6 the court of appeals had before it the
question of whether an ordinance of a village forbidding the issuance of a
building permit for the erection of a building on a lot which did not front
on a dedicated public street was valid. Semi-urban municipalities face diffi-
cult problems in that construction often takes place on new streets before
dedication, and often before any substantial improvements of grading or
sewering take place, with the result that access for purposes of police, fire and
sanitary protection is extremely difficult. Usually the municipality is faced
with paying an improvement cost which ought to be borne by the allotter.
The court held that the ordinance requirement bore no substantial re-
lationship to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the
village and deprived the owner of the lot of the reasonable use of such lot.
Therefore, the ordinance was unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. It
should be noted that the record in the trial court was silent as to any facts
upon which a finding of relationship to the public health could be based,
and that the lot involved was apparently already in existence and of record
at the time of the enactment of the ordinance under consideration.
Off-Street Parking
The supreme court in State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhode7 had occasion to
pass upon several issues in connection with the financing of municipal
parking facilities. It decided that the application of fees collected for use
of on-street parking facilities to the partial payment of bonds issued to
provide off-street facilities was proper. Further, if the amounts charged
for both types of parking were not unreasonable and did not bring in a sum
greater than that amount necessary to pay the total cost of providing both
types of parking facilities, the charge could not be considered a tax. The
court also held that the bonds, which did not constitute a charge upon the
'104 N.E.2d 64 (Ohio App. 1951).
' 92 Ohio App. 233, 108 N.E.2d 569 (1952).
'158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.2d 206 (1952). For a more exhaustive consideration
of this case and related prior cases see Note, 4 WESr. RES. L REv. 142 (1952).
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